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INTRODUCTION

The first law of ecology is that everything is inter-connected. This
principle may also be applied to the relationship between the environ-
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1. B. COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH OUR PLANET, 1990, Sci. Lib. Q. 545 (1990) Al.
Relevant here also is the first law of intelligent tinkering - "to keep every cog and wheel."
A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 190 (1966), quoted in W. REID, J. BARNES & B.
BLACKWELDER, BANKROLLING SUCCESSES: A PORTFOLIO OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS 12 (1988) [hereinafter BANKROLLING SUCCESSES].
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mental crisis and the international debt crisis. These are two of the
most serious problems facing an ever more interdependent world community as we move towards the 21st century. The importance of
resolving these crises receives general agreement. 2 But their interrelationship surprisingly gets little attention; even from those who are
concerned intimately with either issue. 3 A close examination of the two
problems reveals that a mutual debt problem fuels environmental problems (and vice versa) to an alarming rate.
The foreign debt of many nations arose from loans, frequently
ill-advised, which were obtained for rapid industrialization programs
in the 1970s and 1980s. These programs caused severe ecological damage to the ecosystem of many debtor nations. 4 Table 1 gives some
summary statistics of foreign debt. The greatest burden of foreign
debt falls upon Egypt, closely followed by Mexico, where approximately 7% of Gross National Product is devoted to servicing foreign
debt. 5
One of the most perplexing problems facing these debtor nations
is that both debt and debt service are denominated in convertible
currencies.6 The result is that they must earn very large quantities
of dollars or other suitable (convertible or "hard") currency to make
the required payments. 7 Because of the ready international market
for natural resources (lumber, for instance, or paper) and a highly
competitive market for manufactured goods, the debtor nation will
export resources to obtain these currencies. s
The need to earn foreign currency to pay interest and principal on
their heavy international borrowings have led many industrialized and
industrializing nations to over-exploit natural resources and to manufacture exportable goods at the lowest possible cost.9 The environ-

2. But see Hansen, Debt for Nature Swaps: Overview and Discussion of Key Issues, World
Bank Env't Dep't Working Paper No. 1, at 1, (Feb. 1988) (unpublished memorandum) (available
at Growth Management Studies University of Florida College of Law, Gainesville, Fla. 32611)
[hereinafter GMS].
3. Id.
4. See B. CODY, DEBT-FOR-NATURE SwAPs: A BRIEF OVERVIEW, CONG. RESEARCH
SERVICE 2 (July 12, 1988) (analyzing the pros and cons of debt-for-nature swaps).

5. See Statistical Abstract of the United States, at 816 & 841 (1987).
6. See generally Res. & Rec. 17.29, Resolutions and Recommendations, 17th Sess. of the
General Assembly of the International Union for Conservation of Nature & Natural Resources
(IUCN) (Feb. 1988). See Note, Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441-51
(1990); see also Barton, CHRISTIANITY AND CRISIS 48-62 (Mar. 7, 1988).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
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TABLE 1
TOTAL AND PER CAPITA FOREIGN DEBT AND DEBT
SERVICE SELECTED DEBTOR COUNTRIES 1985
DEBT
Argentina
Brazil
Chile
Egypt
India
Indonesia
Mexico
Nigeria
Philippines
Zaire
SOURCE:

$28,671
66,502
10,839
15,808
22,403
22,883
69,007
11,815
11,176
4,084

DEBT SERV.
DEBT/CAPITA
/CAPITA
$919
464
884
313
29
129
845
112
192
130

$92
56
103
47
2
18
136
30
20
11

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,

GNP/CAPITA

%

$1,824
1,987
1,886
674
248
541
1,997
782
734
168

5.0%
2.8%
5.5%
7.0%
0.8%
3.3%
6.8%
3.8%
2.7%
6.5%

1987, pp. 816 and 841.

mental disaster of exploiting natural resources is definitional; the
ecological tragedy of this is obvious in the toxic waste pollution that
results from "saving money" by omitting pollution control equipment
and by allowing inadequate treatment or storage of toxic by-products.
The global destruction of rainforests resulting from rapid industrialization and from efforts to earn foreign currency through forest
and farm exports has received much attention in the press. 10 Unfortunately, this relationship is not one of mere connection. Rather, it is
a reflexive operation between goods production and resource degradation, and can be a factor in any ecological problem in industrializing
debtor nations." For example, an official from Kenya speculated that

the relatively small number of wildebeest which participated in the
annual migration from Tanzania to Kenya in the summer of 1989 a migration that has occurred since the beginning of recorded history
can be attributed to Tanzania's need to export canned wildebeest
to China to pay principal or interest on industrial development debts
to China. Allegedly, fires were set by the Tanzanians along the border
to keep wildebeests in Tanzania and available for slaughter and canning.1 2 If the explanation is apocryphal, nevertheless, it shows that
world debt and world ecology are warp and woof of one fabric.

10.

See, e.g. de Lanna, Brazil Resists Campaign to Save Rain Forest, Chicago Tribune,

Mar. 12, 1989, at C1, col. 1.
11. See, e.g., id.
12.

See supra note 2.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1990

3

Florida JournalFLORIDA
of International
Law, Vol.LAW
5, Iss.
2 [1990], Art. 3
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL

II.

[Vol. 5

THE DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAP CONCEPT

A debt-for-nature swap is essentially the cancellation or suspension
of a portion of a nation's external debt in return for commitment to
various types of environmental programs.13 Typically, a nonprofit conservation organization buys from a commercial bank (or receives from
the bank as a donation) discounted sovereign debt, and by agreement
with the debtor country, converts the debt into local currency or bonds
to support local conservation projects administered by local nonprofit
groups. 14 In this manner not only the debt burden but the need for
hard currency is reduced. 15
The nature swap is a variation on the debt-equity exchange programs that the international financial system has offered as one response to the problem of international debt. 16 Ultimately, such swaps
help to preserve global environmental balance, directly by conservation
projects and indirectly by debt reduction.
Most nature swaps have thus far focused on the earth's rain forest. 17
This tropical environment is at once the stabilizer of worldwide ecology
and the lifeblood of debtor nations' economy.1 8 Additionally, nations
with remaining rain forests appear disproportionately on the list of
debtor nations carrying excessive burdens.19 Science has revealed the
vital ecological role of forests in general, and especially of rainforests. °
Many nations, however, see their environment strictly as a source of
immediate economic (hard currency) gain. 21 It is a well-recognized
economic fact that the most beneficial exchanges will be ones into

13.

Id.

14. See generally Reilly, Designing Deals for Debt, World Wildlife Federation (WWF)
Letter (1988) (briefly discussing history and function of debt swaps, emphasizing sustainable
development as a mode of conservation); Chamberlin, Gruson & Weltchek, Sovereign Debt
Exchanges, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 415 (1988) (examining in depth the debt exchange generally);
see B. CODY, 8upra note 4, at 2; Hansen, supra note 2.
15. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 14, at 5.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 3.
18. See B. CODY, supra note 4, at 2.
19. Id.
20. Nations possessing roughly 50% of the world's biological diversity also owe one fourth
of the developing world's debt. Reilly, supra note 14, at 4.
21. One article has asserted that at its present rate of destruction tropical forests will be
completely obliterated by 1995 and all tropical forests will be largely or seriously destroyed by
the year 2000. The Vanishing Jungle: Ecologists Make Friendswith Economists, ECONOMIST,
Oct. 15, 1988, at 25 [hereinafter The Vanishing Jungle].
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which the parties enter because they accommodate the needs of each,
logically and fairly, and not when one trading partner is compelled to
sell at any terms in order to raise convertible currency.Debt-for-nature exchange programs depend upon a heavily discounted secondary market in high-risk debt, exactly the type of debt
issued by the countries of concern. 23 In this market, debt notes may
be acquired at a fraction of their face value and then used to obtain
equity in the debtor country and in the domestic currency. 24 In a
similar fashion, debt may be acquired by a conservation organization
and then, by a mechanism suited to the particular debtor country,
5
converted to environmental protections and programs.2
The debt-for-nature swaps of Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and
the Philippines are those most often discussed. 26 Each agreement was
structured differently to meet the needs - social and political, legal
and financial - of the country involved. 27 Two elements have been
constant in all nature swaps, however, and in this fact lies the peculiar
beauty of the swap. Each swap has reduced external debt and funded
conservation.
III.

THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT

The debt-for-nature swap in its original form, however, is necessarily limited because it must rely on exchange of commercial debt only.
Its outgrowth, "sustainable development," is the model of resource
use that attempts to balance and integrate worldwide environmental
integrity with nations' need for economic stability. '" Two points are
worth noting here. First is the evident value of programs that are
equally sound, both environmentally and economically. Second is the
fact that such programs came into being only after the construct "debtfor-nature" replaced the old paradigm of simple preservation and then

22. Id. at 26.
23. See Chamberlin, supra note 14, at 446; see also Burand, The Debt-for-NatureExchange:
A Conservation Tool for Non-Profit Organizations(May 22, 1989) (Draft of Conservation International monograph) (available at GMS) (published in shorter version in INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
July, 1989).
24. Burand, supra note 23, at 12.
25.

Id.

26. See Chamberlin, supra note 14, at 440.
27. For an overview of the major debt-for-nature swaps, see generally Debt-for-Nature:
The Second Year, SwAPs, vol. 2, no. 11, Nov. 1988 [hereinafter SwAPs].
28. See id.
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emerged as "sustainable development."I That is to say, what has
historically been considered a good balance - that is, sustainable evidently is not.- The poisoned atmosphere, the disrupted hydrological
system, the sterile soil, and the inexorable warming of the climate all
3
indicate that the prevailing model is not sustainable. 1
This article consists of four sections. The first section describes
the background and utility of debt-for-nature swaps. The second sets
out the basic economics of these swaps. Next are short descriptions
of four swaps carried out thus far. The last section is a brief inquiry
into the possibilities of private sector and public agency swaps.
IV.

THE BACKGROUND OF DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS

The idea of swapping debt for nature appeared in a 1984 New
York Times column written by Thomas E. Lovejoy, then vice-president for science for the World Wildlife Fund. 2 "Stimulating conservation while ameliorating debt would encourage progress on both fronts,"
according to Lovejoy.8m The relation of debt to environmental degradation cannot be precisely formulated, and a causal connection is not
universally accepted. 34 That the world stands today in a precarious
position both economically and environmentally, however, is clear.
In less than a decade the world's outstanding external debt has
increased from about $580 billion, or some 28% of worldwide GNP,
to over $1.3 trillion, nearly 50% of GNP.m Aggressive lending of petrodollars after the energy crisis of the 1970s established a world con-

29.

The term gained public recognition with the World Commission on Environment and

Development (the Brundtland Commission), whose proceedings were published as OUR COMMON
FUTURE (1987). See also J. RIFKIN, ENTROPY: INTO THE GREENHOUSE WORLD (rev. ed.
1989).

30. See International Conservation Financing Project: Maintaining Biodiversity and Critical
Ecosystems in Support of Sustainable Development, World Resources Institute (Sept. 10, 1988)
(available at GMS).
31.

See generally

BANKROLLING

AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

DOLLARS:

INTERNATIONAL

(1986). See also F.

DEVELOPMENT

BOSSELMAN,

BANKS

IN THE WAKE OF THE

TOURIST (1975).

32.

See generally S.

SCHNEIDER,

GLOBAL

WARMING:

ARE

WE

ENTERING THE

GREENHOUSE CENTURY? (1989).

33.

See Lovejoy, Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology, N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1984, at A-31. Dr.

Lovejoy reformulated an earlier plan offered by Ira Rubicoff of the Smithsonian Institute.

34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 2, at 4-5 (demonstrating mathematically that debt crisis
does not necessarily cause environmental crisis, while recognizing that economic formulas are
not proof against human behavior).
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text of enormous debt. Recession followed in the early 1980s, accom37
panied by the collapse in commodity prices that continues today.
This history forced such innovative financial solutions as the debtequity swap, the forerunner of the debt-for-nature swap-8
A debt-equity swap is relatively straightforward in mechanics. Usually it will work in the following way: A foreign investor purchases
dollar-denominated debt from a private commercial bank at a discount
and then converts it, with the approval of the debtor government,
into local currency or local debt to be exchanged for equity in a local
asset.3 9 This form of debt conversion reduces the burden of debt payments by allocating equity to creditors, and replaces interest payments
with dividend payments.4°
Despite such challenges as debt-equity exchanges, many countries'
burden of indebtedness remains an enormity, and their ability to carry
on under that burden, problematic. 41 The weighted average of debt
outstanding, at the beginning of 1989 was some 30% lower than at the
beginning of the previous year.
Coincidental with the gloomy debt picture, and darkened by it,
even largely caused by it, is the world's equally discomforting environmental prospect. For example, to mention only one area of destruction,
at its present rate of destruction, tropical forests would vanish by the
opening of the next century. 42
This forecast has global significance for these forests are a vast
gene bank, or pool, of potential crops and medicines." The forests
directly supply homes, livelihoods, and fuelwood to hundreds of millions of people." From them, $8 billion worth of timber products alone
are exported annually.Forests regulate local river systems, govern flooding, prevent soil
and water degradation, and permit agricultural irrigation. 46 Without

36.

WORLD BANK'S WORLD DEBT TABLES

1987-88.

37. See Angermueller, Introduction,SOVEREIGN

LENDING: MANAGING LEGAL RISK Vol.

V1I (1984).

38. Id.
39. See generally Chamberlin, supra note 14.
40. See id. at 418.
41. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 3.
42. Id.
43. The Vanishing Jungle, supra note 21, at 25. See also Hope Reaches the Amazon,
ECONOMIST, July 15, 1989, at 47 [hereinafter Hope Reaches the Amazon] (showing some optimism about the effect of debt exchange on this "gene bank").
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Hope Reaches the Amazon, supra note 43.
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its forests to balance the environment, an area may be unable to
47
support its inhabitants.

Forests regulate the composition of the atmosphere as well. 48 When
burned, forests release gases that contribute to the thinning of the
ozone layer. 49 The burning itself adds carbon dioxide that traps the

sun's heat in the lower atmosphere.- The resulting loss of forest eliminates the major agent for removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere - the trees that convert carbon dioxide into leaves and wood'
and release oxygen. 51 Regeneration is slow - in the case of tropical
forest, it takes 100 years. 52
Indonesia's government has moved millions of settlers onto the
outer islands, hoping to promote national integration by populating
these areas with Japanese migrants. 53 Of course, Indonesia is also
concerned about the burden of meeting its foreign debt repayment
requirements within a context of a population growing at 1.7% (3
million individuals) per year.- Commercial logging in West Africa and
Southeast Asia is so heavy that it not only accounts for one fourth of
the world's annual rainforest loss, but in addition has virtually
exhausted the supply of hardwoods in those areas.- Leaving one portion of the globe devastated and impoverished, the hardwood trade
must shift now to Central Africa and the Amazon Basin. 56
While they insisted on perfect biogeographical preservation, environmentalists recognized that these measures could interrupt a nation's modernization. 6 7 Economists have perceived the ineffectiveness
of substituting a farm or ranch for a forest when this can result in
devastating consequences such as soil sterility, flooding, hunger and
displacement of large populations. 8
International conservation organizations, concerned with the continuing degeneration of the global environment, have taken advantage

47. The Vanishing Jungle, supra note 21, at 25.
48. One fifth of the world's population is directly injured by the insufficiency of forest to
regulate natural systems. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 26.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 1987-88 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 818.
56. See The Vanishing Jungle, supra note 21, at 26.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 28.
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of the equally catastrophic worldwide debt crisis.a9 These groups have
successfully exchanged steeply-discounted dollar-denominated debt for
local capital.6 In return, the debtor country carries out projects resulting in better environmental practices or quality61
Even when extensive costs in time and specialized human resources
are added to the cost of the debt itself, the benefit to both environment
and economy is clear.On both fronts, the pristine ideal of debt-for-nature exchanges is
subject to the practicalities of implementation. 63 Experts offer evidence
that good management will produce more immediate hard currency
6
than the traditional destructive methods. 4
V.

THE ECONOMICS OF DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS

The economics of a debt-for-nature swap are no different than for
any other commodity.- The owner of a particular resource, in most
cases land of environmental significance, will put that resource to the
use that yields the greatest benefit to that owner. The definition of
"benefit" changes with the circumstances. However, debt-for-nature
swaps approach land conservation from a financial viewpoint.6
The objective of most debt-for-nature swaps is to place a resource,
(i.e., certain lands) into a classification that will yield a lower current
return, or benefit, to its owner in order to prevent depletion of the
resource. This is not to say that society will necessarily receive a
lessened return, or that long-term return will be reduced. 67 Rather,
resource allocators usually place little significance on societal or long-

59. Hope Reaches the Amazon, supra note 43, at 47.
60. See B. CODY, supra note 4, at 3.
61. Id.
62. See Burand, supra note 23, at 4. These might include establishing and maintaining
national parks and reserves to safeguard biogenetic diversity; reformulating agriculture, fishery,
forest, and rangeland programs, for production both greater and environmentally more sound;
working toward an energy-efficient economy, by improving the design of energy-using mechanism
to replace nonrenewable fuel with solar, wind, biomass, and geothermal sources; regulating
those human activities that produce carbon dioxide or methane, two significant greenhouse
gases; and offering education and training opportunities in, say, resource management. See
generally Burand, supra note 23. See also ICFP, supra note 30, at 2.
63. For an overview of the benefits and detriments of debt-for-nature exchanges, see generally SwAps, supra note 27, at 8. See also Reilly, supra note 14, at 7.
64. See SwAps, supra note 27, at 8.
65. See Chamberlin, supra note 14, at 445.
66. See id. at 440.
67. See generally Hansen, supra note 2.
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term values. 68 Defending the short-term orientation of private decisionmakers, Lord Keynes once said that "in the long term we'll all be
dead!" Though he spoke of individuals, and not of the planet, the quip
was prophetic on the subject of debt-for-nature swaps. Even so, any
long-term economic possibility must be at least as valid as the shortterm choice traditionally regarded as beneficial.
The decisionmaker in the host country deals in the domestic currency and looks for the highest return. Most often this return is
obtained by the production of goods to be exported for hard currency.This hard currency is then converted into the domestic currency at a
rate that reflects the country's need for that currency. The greater
the need for convertible currency, the higher the domestic value of
that currency, and thus the greater the inducement to turn available
resources into exportable products. Naturally, this situation aggravates domestic shortages, and world prices in dollars tend to dictate
domestic production decisions.
The acquisition of discounted debt in a money market center such
as New York begins the exchange.7° Debt from nations such as Costa
Rica, Bolivia, Brazil or Poland could recently be purchased for as little
as 20%, when trading in dollars.71 For example, Brazilian debt of $50
million might be acquired for $10 million.72 The $50 million face value
of the debt would be sold in Brazil for New Cruzados (NCZ) at a rate
of NCZ 10,000 to $1, for a total of NCZ 500,000 million. This amount
would purchase domestic land to be reserved for some type of environmental purpose.
A very significant side benefit is that the debt would no longer
need to be serviced in dollars. 73 Local currency debt service, by reducing the need for dollars, would reduce the pressure on the exchange
rate. 74 And at the same time, production could be re-oriented toward
the domestic market.75

68. Hansen explains resource protection in terms of export value for developing countries.
69. See The Vanishing Jungle, supra note 21, at 25.
70. See B. CODY, supra note 4, at 2.
71. See Chamberlin, supra note 14, at 418.
72. U.S. Efforts to Aid Debtor Nations Bring "Profound Disappointment," N.Y. Times,
July 24, 1989, at A-i.
73. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 14, at 3.
74. Testimony of Sheldon Annis, of the Overseas Development Council for U.S. Senate
Committee of Foreign Relations, subcommittee on International Economic Policy, Trade, Oceans,
and the Environment (Apr. 27, 1988) (available at GMS).
75. Debt-for-NatureSwaps: Environmental Concerns, § 537(3) of the Foreign Air Authorization, TREAS. REP. (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter TREAS. REP.] (available at GMS).
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Economically speaking, debt-for-nature swaps depend upon combined price distortions. First, the debt swapped is high-risk and thus
discounted; 76 second, the hard currency exchange rates of most debtor
nations greatly favor the hard currency.7 The major economic hurdle
is to obtain the dollar balance to acquire the discounted debt in the
first place.7M For the early swaps, the amounts were accumulated by
conservation groups through their regular fund-raising programs.7- An
alternative might be tax credits for donations of debt that is part of
a nature swap.A0
Debt-for-nature swaps rely upon deep discounts of debt. At such
discounts, a debtor nation cannot obtain current credit. If the nation
betters the credit rating in order to obtain current credit, the discount
drops and the cost of the swap rises. Additionally, bidding for discounted debt will itself reduce the discount and raise the price of
preservation. Finally, some debtor nations see swaps as an infringement on domestic authority and an insult to national dignity. 1
Nevertheless, the economics of the debt-for-nature swap - including both pure debt-for-nature exchange and sustainable development
program - is alluring. A part of the world environment is preserved.
A part of a very burdensome foreign debt is eliminated. 2 The debtor
country has reduced its need for foreign currency and so may concentrate on domestic production.

76. Such as gradually utilizing nature areas to harvest exportable products like medicines.
See, e.g., The Vanishing Jungle, supra note 21, at 28.
77. See Reilly, supra note 14, at 3.
78. See Fuller & Williamson, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A New Means of Funding Conservation in Developing Nations, 11 INT'L ENV'L REP. 301-02 (1988).
79. See TREAS. REP., supra note 75, at 2.
80. See, e.g., Reilly, supra note 14, at 6.
81. For a discussion on the tax benefits of debt-for-nature swaps in particular, I.R.S. Rev.
Rul. 87-124, 1987-47 I.R.B. See generally TREAS. REP., supra note 75. See also Dionne, Treasury Agrees to Construe Revenue Ruling on Debt-for-NatureSwaps Liberally, TAX NOTES, Apr.
18, 1988, at 307, and W. Lamp, A Tax Blueprint for LDC Debt-for-Development Swaps, Paper
Delivered at the Seminar for Private Voluntary Organizations sponsored by the Agency for
International Development (A.I.D.) of the U.S. State Department (May 23, 1988) (available at
GMS). The I.R.S. ruling appears to give debt-for-nature investors both a deduction force loss
and a charitable contribution. However, these articles state that the ruling needs to address
certain questions.
82. See, e.g., Barton, Debt Swaps: New Game in Town, CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS, Mar.
7, 1988, at 62.
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FOUR DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS83

A.

Bolivia

The first debt-for-nature exchange took place in July, 1987, between Bolivia and Conservation International (CI), a nongovernment
conservation organization headquartered in Washington, D.C.8

CI

purchased U.S. $650,000 of Bolivian commercial bank debt for U.S.
$100,000, donated by the Frank Weeden Foundation, from an affiliate
of Citibank, N.A.m CI agreed to extinguish the $650,000 debt, and
Bolivia agreed to set up a local currency endowment fund equaling
U.S. $250,000 to pay management cost for Beni Biosphere Reserve
in Northeastern Bolivia. A local conservation organization administers
the conservation program and oversees a commission of local officials,
scientists, and conservationists that plan projects and maintains conservation programs for the reserve.A
In addition, CI agreed to provide technical assistance, training,
and international coordination. s7 Bolivia now has a Bolivian Interinstitutional Technical Commission composed of local, regional, and
national government and nongovernment organizations to advise the
Beni Ecosystem Program. Further, CI has collaborated independently with individual organizations, government agencies, the National Environmental League (LIDEMA), the Beni Forestry Service,
the National Conservation Data Center, the National Institute of Ecology, and other scientific and academic organizations.8 By virtue of
these collaborations, there have been important achievements in forestry management, biological research, and environmental education.0
B.

Ecuador

In a subsequent debt-for-nature exchange, the government of
Ecuador agreed in October of 1987 to allow the exchange of up to

83. This debt now exceeds $1.3 trillion. Debt-for-Nature: Swaps Can Save the Rain Forest,
San Francisco Chron., Apr. 24, 1990, at A-23.
84. See generally Conservation International Fact Sheet, at 1 (1987) [hereinafter Bolivia
Fact Sheet] (available at GMS). See also Reilly, supra note 14, at 5.
85. Bolivia Fact Sheet, at 2.
86. Bramble, Burand, Curtis, Page & Sweatman, A Brief Summary of Debt-for-Nature
Swaps, Debt-for-Nature Ad Hoc Working Group, at 4 [hereinafter Working Group] (available
at GMS).
87. Burand, supra note 23, at 5.
88. Id. at 6.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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U.S. $10 million of commercial bank debt for local currency bonds. 91
The principal will fund an endowment for Fundacion Natura, the
Ecuadorean private conservation group which brought about the
swap. 92 The interest will finance a broad range of conservation activities, such as protection and management of natural areas and their
buffer zones, and training conservationists.9 In early 1988 the World
Wildlife Fund (WWF) acquired U.S. $1 million and exchanged it at
9
100% of its face amount for local currency bonds to mature in 1996. 4
Then in April 1989, the World Wildlife Fund and the Nature Conservancy agreed to acquire the remaining $9 million, to be converted by
the Central Bank of Ecuador into local currency bonds to mature in
nine years. 95
C.

Costa Rica

By early 1988, the initial ceiling of U.S. $5.4 million agreed to by
the Costa Rican government would be converted into local currency
bonds to create a Natural Resources Conservation Fund. 9 The principal and interest from the bonds would finance such conservation
activities as expansion and management of parks.- To bring about
this swap, international conservation organizations donated cash and
purchased commercial bank debt in the secondary market, exchanging
it for local currency bonds in the amount of 75% of face amount of
debt. 98 Additionally, the Nature Conservancy arranged a swap of U.S.
$5.6 million in early 1989 for local currency bonds equalling 30% of
the face amount.
The Dutch government has agreed as part of its bilateral aid program to Costa Rica to fund an exchange of more than U.S. $39 million
of commercial bank debt." Local currency bonds in the amount of 30%
face value of the debt will fund reforestation and soil conservation
projects.- °o Furthermore, the Swedish government will exchange U.S.
$25 million commercial bank debt for local currency bonds equaling

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See id. at 8; see also B. CODY, supra note 4, at 11.
Burand, supra note 23, at 8.
Fuller & Williamson, supra note 78, at 302.
Burand, supra note 23, at 8. See Chamberlin, supra note 14, at 443-45.
Id.
Fuller & Williamson, supra note 78, at 302.
Id.
Working Group, supra note 86, at 2.
See SWAPS, supra note 27, at 7.
Id.
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75% fact value, for environmental projects.l 1 Another program, now
under consideration, would involve the exchange of U.S. $45 million of
commercial bank debt for twenty-year bonds. 102Participants would be
a combination of conservation, development, and micro enterprise organizations. 10
D.

The Philippines

Debt-for-nature swaps have not only been conducted or utilized in
Latin America. The Philippine government, the Haribon Foundation,
and the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) entered into an agreement
whereby the WWF would acquire up to U.S. $2 million American
bank debt to be exchanged for local currency at 100% of face value. 104
The Haribon Foundation would use the local currency to finance park
improvements, training programs, and other environmental efforts
carried out by the Philippine Department of Environmental Natural
Resources, as well as a portion of the Department's administrative
costs. This swap began in January, 1989, using U.S. $390,000.
VII.

SOME POSSIBLE ADVANTAGES OF DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS

Some types of debt-for-nature swaps require a debtor and a creditor
whose laws permit debt restructuring. Latin American countries, for
instance, tend to have debt-equity laws in place. Furthermore, most
Latin American debt is private, held by commercial banks, and thus
available for sale on the secondary market and trade at substantial
discount.
For these reasons, and because rainforest is a very visible locus
of ecological degradation, debt-for-nature swaps first involved protection of tropical forests. The idea has wider application, however, with
respect to both debtor and project.
A.

Private Sector Economic Considerations

In addition to sale of debt to environmental groups, swaps can
include donation of debt. Fleet National Bank of Rhode Island gave
U.S. $254,000 in a Costa Rican debt exchange; a Chase Manhattan
Bank affiliate donated U.S. $400,000 of Bolivian debt; and Midland

101.

Burand, supm note 23, at 11.

102.

Id. at 10, n.7.

103.
104.

Id.
B. CODY, supra note 4, at 12.
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Bank, a British entity, gave the equivalent of U.S. $800,000 for a
Sudanese exchange. 1°
A commercial bank is free to employ debt variously to the end of
economic advantage because its mission is a profit-making one. It may
restructure debt, sell it at a discount, or donate it to a conservation
group organizing a nature swap. A bank might choose one of these
options in order to minimize loss on nonperforming debt.
These possibilities are not equally attractive to the bank, however.
Restructuring offers the possibility of profit; sale at a discount with
a tax deduction on the amount of the loss realizes some monetary
return; and donation allows tax deduction only.
A bank's ultimate financial situation will be about the same (leaving
aside certain tax or accounting strategies not relevant here) whether
it gives away its debt paper to charity or writes it off as a loss.
Revenue Ruling 87-124, as interpreted by the Treasury Department,
considerably improves the tax status of a donor bank.-° The interpretation construes a charitable donation of debt to be an event composed
of two separate transactions, with tax deductions for both totaling
100% of the tax basis.
The first transaction is an exchange of debt for local currency,
with a deductible tax loss on the difference between the face value of
the debt and its fair market value in local currency. The second is a
donation of the fair market value amount to a conservation organization, with a tax deduction for charitable donation. Two requirements
of such an exchange are: 1) that new debt issued in exchange for the
swapped debt be sufficiently different from the original debt, and 2)
that a U.S. charity retain sufficient control over the donated debt.
Three factors may make debt-for-nature exchanges carried out by
commercial banks "an increasingly viable means of supporting conservation."1 7 These are loan trading volume; secondary market prices of
some loans; and perception that debt swaps are profitable in ways not
limited to immediate economic gain. 10 Because debt parcels are typi1

105. Midland Donates Sudanese Debt, J. Com., Dec. 28, 1988, at 7A. With this exchange,
the British entered the swap picture.
106. See W. Lamp, A Tax Blueprint for LDC Debt-for-Development Swaps (unpublished
paper presented at AID Seminar for PVOs, May 23, 1988) (explaining the Steuerle interpretation
letter, id.) See also Burand, supra note 23, at 17, n.13, and at 18, n.14 (analyzing the probable
effects of the Ruling and the Steuerle Letter on debt-for-nature exchanges).
107. Burand, supra note 23, at 11.
108. Id. at 11-14. See also SwAps, supra note 27, at 10.
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cally large and tend to be held by bank consortiums, rather than single
institutions, debt-for-nature swaps offer wide scope for imaginative
combinations of finance mechanisms.
B.

Public Agency Considerations

Public agency debt is not presently handled so flexibly as private
sector debt. Strictures against private options discussed above reflect
certain policy considerations, such as a concern for healthy credit
ratings. But development organizations - multilateral development
banks such as the World Bank and the International Money Fund;
regional development banks such as the International Development
Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the African Development Bank; and bilateral institutions such as the Agency for International Development - are examining the need for new models of
development aid. 109
Mr. Babacar N'Diaye, President of the African Development Bank
(A)fDB), is said to be interested in projects to reverse desertification
or to reforest. He has suggested that the AfDB "might be able to
provide start up money for a debt swap investment and also might
act as a mediator between the debtor and the creditor.'11
Under the 1988 Foreign Air Authorization Act, the U.S. Treasury
Department must analyze the potential for countries to satisfy portions
of multilateral and other development debt "through investments in
conservation of tropical forests, wetlands and other conservation activities.' ' At that point the Department found that while existing
conditions preclude multilaterals' offerings of alternative financing
techniques, other forms of participation in debt-for-nature exchange
are appropriate. These included technical assistance, broker or agent
function, and private initiative piggy-back onto multilaterals' loans. 112
The World Bank already has the capacity to alter the pattern of
international energy investment to encourage efficiency and environmental reform. 113 For instance, the Bank financed a Ghanaian transpor-

109. See, e.g., Burand, supra note 23, at 27ff; U.S. Says Third World Loans Pose Environmental Danger, Investor's Daily, Apr. 26, 1988, at 23.
110. L. Williams, Statement on Behalf of the Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Environmental Defense Fund, Environmental Policy Institute, before the International Development Institutions & Finance Subcomm., House Comm.
on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs, May 24, 1988. (form).
111. 1988 Foreign Aid Authorization Act, § 537(c) (form).
112. Debt-for-Nature Swaps, Treas. Rpt (March, 1988).
113. See generally World Bank Env't Dep't Working Paper No. 1, supra note 2.
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tation project to use manpower instead of motor power, in the form
14
of bicycles, handcarts, and low-cost roads.1
Significantly, the Bank is now negotiating the first swap involving
a multilateral agency - a $5 million investment in Paraguay.115
Whether it participates in swaps or not, nothing need prevent the
Bank from acting according to the spirit of its 1987 reorganization
highlighting ecological concerns. It is uniquely situated to lead the
private sector in placing efficiency improvements at the center of
lending programs; and it could also encourage borrowers to pursue
energy efficiency and put freed funds to other environmental use.
A strong instance of progress in the exchange of public debt for
environmental protection is the German government's announcement
on the occasion of Kenyan minister's February, 1989, visit to Bonn
that 817 million DM of debt (about 440 million in U.S. dollars) would
be exchanged for environmental projects to be undertaken by Kenya.
16
The swap program will be carried out over a period of several years.
Other countries earmarked
for such exchanges of debt are Zaire,
7
Madagascar.1
and
Ghana,
Germany has demonstrated its recognition that debt and the environment are interdependent. In addition, the seven major industrialized nations of the world endorsed the concept of the debt swap
118
at the July, 1989, international economic summit in Paris.
The U.S. government followed suit in September, 1989, participating for the first time in a swap - a project designed to preserve
Madagascar's rainforest (reduced by half since 1950). Madagascar
bought back $3 million in debt discounted by 45%.119 A governmentfunded swap in Panama, aimed at protecting the Panama Canal's
watershed, is before Congress and expected to be approved. 12

114. WORLDWATCH, vol. 2, no. 3 passim, May-June 1989.
115. Paisley, Nature Swaps Near in Panama, Am. BANKER, Apr. 3, 1990, at 12.
116. Telephone interview with personnel from the German Information Center, June 8, 1989.
117. H. Kohl, Meeting Twin Threats: The Debt Crisis and Environmental Destruction,
Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund and The World Bank, Berlin (Sept. 27,
1988) (unpublished paper), reprinted in STATEMENTS & SPEECHES, vol. XI, no. 16, (Sept. 28,
1988). Chancellor Kohl warned that although economic growth may spell progress, "it would be
a pyrrhic victory if increased prosperity could only be gained at the expense of destroying our
vitally essential environment."
118. Anderson, Miracle Drugsfrom Tropical Forest, Wash. Post, Dec. 17,1989 (final ed.).
119. Madgascarto Get U.S. Aid in "Debt-for-Nature"Swap, L.A. Times, Aug. 4, 1989, at
1-7, col. 1.
120. Paisley, supra note 115.
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The debt-for-nature swap may be considered wherever there is
national debt and environmental concern. The Polish government, for
example, has recently suggested a transformation of indebtedness
owed Sweden into investment in Polish environmental protection, in
particular of the Baltic Sea.121
Another kind of conservation plan suitable to the debt-for-nature
concept is Sudan's rural water purification project.1- Typical of the
most effective debt exchanges, this program frees funds for investment
in sensible resource management, which in turn will yield greater
domestic income.
A combination of debt reduction strategies might also encourage
the reversal of national policies destructive of the atmosphere. The
mutual dependence of economic needs and ecologic needs is nowhere
more evident than in the world's burden of carbon dioxide, sulfur
dioxide, and chlorofluorocarbons. These by-products of resource development - implicated in global warming, depletion of the ozone layer,
123
and acid rain - are destroying other vital resources.
Policy reformulations recognizing that the principle of sound resource management combines both economic benefit and environmental
protection are evident on several levels. First, development agencies
are beginning to invest in the environment. An example is the Tropical
Forest Action Plan adopted by a task force comprising the World
Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Resources Institute.'1' Second, conservation groups have responded to
the need of investment to address sustainable yield needs as well as
environmental protection needs; and development agencies have shown
their willingness to incorporate the group's criticisms in shaping their
policies.'1? Finally, sovereign governments are making strenuous efforts to study the links between national debt, economic development,
and environmental degradation.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The phrase "debt-for-nature" has matured to encompass a notion
of resource management that recognizes the interdependence of human

121.
122.
123.

Xinhua General Overseas, News Service, Feb. 10, 1989.
WORLDWATCH, supra note 114.
See generally BANKROLLING SUCCESSES, supra note 1; No Time to Waste,
WORLDWATCH, vol. 2, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 11-14.
124. International Conservation Financing Project: Maintaining Biodiversity and Critical
Ecosystems in Support of Sustainable Development, World Resources Institute, Sept. 10, 1988,
at 14. See also The Vanishing Jungle, supra note 21, at 28.
125. See, e.g., The Vanishing Jungle, supra note 21.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss2/3

18

Juergensmeyer and Nicholas: Debt-for-Nature
Swaps:SWAPS
A Modest But Meaningful Response to Two In
DEBT-FOR-NATURE

social progress and world environmental integrity. Debt-for-nature
swaps, by increasing the conservation budget of debtor nations, can
help them to conserve their natural resource base. It is this base that
will sustain the long-term economic productivity essential to the future
well-being of developing and developed countries both. Sustainable
development, by the same token, is typically many times as profitable
as the slash-and-burn methods it replaces.126
Debt-for-nature swaps are not, however, without their detractors.
The skeptics point out quite correctly that the amount of international
debt which can be eliminated or alleviated is only a drop in the bucket
and the amount of environmental protection which can result is therefore equally limited thereby relegating such programs to a "band-aid"
status. Others oppose the use of such arrangements on the theory
that it inevitably or frequently constitutes an interference with the
sovereignty of the debtor nation.
Another problem raised by some is that of enforcement of the
agreements. What, they ask, will happen if the land protected is later
developed contrary to the agreement. If an agreement between governments is involved, then the normal means - adequate or not for enforcement of agreements between sovereigns would be available.
If the arrangements have been made between private environmental
groups and debtor sovereigns then the use of international observer
groups and arbitration entities would seem appropriate.
Some observers suggest that the current international financial
circumstances encouraging debt-for-nature exchanges are in flux, because governments and public agencies are rethinking these questions.
Treasury Secretary Brady's plan, for instance, would alter significantly
the relation between debtor-borrower, commercial banks, and multilateral institutions. 127 Such policy examinations set the stage for bringing
into play the creative energies of sovereign governments, public lending agencies, and private commercial banks.
At the same time, hearings continue to be held, and bills that
recognize the need for extraordinary means of addressing ecological

126. For an excellent analysis of the place of sustainable development in insuring global
well-being, including descriptions of several projects around the world, see BANKROLLING
SUCCESSES,

supra note 1.

127. What has come to be called the Brady Plan is the substance of testimony of U.S.
Treas. Sec'y Nicholas Brady before the Foreign Operations Subcomm., House Appropriations
Comm., Mar. 10, 1989, controversial because it advocates entry of the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund into innovative strategies to manage world debt, which in some
observers' eyes would result in certain death of the international financial structure. See Evolution of the Debt Strategy, Christian Science Monitor, Apr. 5, 1989, at 1.
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decay continue to move through Congress. 128 A Joint Economic Subcommittee heard testimony on June 13, 1989, from World Resources Institute senior economist Robert Repetto that governments must modify
their statistical systems so as to recognize natural resources as a
depreciable asset, and in that way acknowledge the vital connection
between economic growth and environmental protection. 129 A House
of Representatives continuing resolution repeats the call to reduce
debt in return for environmental protections. 13 Furthermore, a World
Resources Institute paper researching financing mechanisms states
unequivocally that "it is essential that policies to ensure sustainable
natural resource use be part of the agenda of debt restructuring."131
Debt-for-nature swaps in their pure form, though modest, are indeed a worthwhile response to the world's two problems of degraded
environmental and developing country debt. The greatest portion of
this debt is not available for such programs because its exchange
would destroy the international credit market. The metamorphosis of
the nature swap into sustainable development, however, represents
a vital transformation whose response to ecological imperatives encourages economic integrity at the same time. 132

128. See, e.g., supra note 127.
129. U.S. Urged to Back Change in U.N. Accounts to Recognize Natural Resources As
Assets, DAILY REP'T FOR EXECUTIVES, June 14, 1989.
130. HCR 44, Feb. 6, 1989, calling on the Int. DRS, and bank regulators to encourage
banks to, reduce the debt service burden of debtor nations in exchange for steps taken by such
nations to protect tropical rainforests and other natural resources.
131. Quoted in Reilly, supra note 14, at 4.
132. SwAPS, supra note 27; WRI will bring in new money (find info). In its new guise,
also, the nature swap avoids a difficulty anticipated by such participants as Randall Curtis, who
has expressed concern that countries ...
etc., letter to Growth Management Studies, Aug. 4,
1989. See also Brown, Environment Caught in Trade War Crossfire, Fin. Times, Nov. 23, 1989,
at 6 (pointing out that Indonesia could jeopardize its "relatively good" credit rating with the
international community, as well as raise difficult sovereignty issues, were it to attempt a nature
swap).
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